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“History may therefore be looked upon as an extensive development of 
meaning and as an irradiation of meanings from a multiplicity of organizing 
centers.”1 
 
“The constant shaking of the naïve sense of meaningfulness is itself a 
new mode of meaning, a discovery of its continuity with the mysteriousness 
of being and what-is as whole.”2 
 
Paul Ricœur was one of the first philosophers to recognize the 
importance of Patočka’s thought in the field of phenomenology. By 
acknowledging Patočka as a key figure in the history of phenomenology and 
his constant confrontation with other phenomenologists, such as Husserl, 
Heidegger, Fink, and Merleau-Ponty, Ricœur enabled the reception of the 
Czech author to the philosophical community. Specifically, in 1981 he wrote 
the preface to the French edition of Patočka’s Heretical Essays in the Philosophy 
of History.3 One year after Patočka’s death, Ricœur wrote also an entry on 
Patočka’s life and works for the Encyclopedia Universalis (1978) and other 
comprehensive studies on his thought, such as the essays “Patočka et le 
nihilisme” (1990)4 and “Jan Patočka: d’une philosophie du monde naturel à 
une philosophie de l’histoire” (1997).5 The major points of the twenty years of 
Ricœur’s reading of Patočka’s work, ranging from his death in 1977 to the 
conference dedicated to his philosophical heritage which took place in 
Neapolis in 1997, are summarized in Domenico Jervolino’s article “Ricœur 
lecteur de Patočka” (2007).6 Whereas Ricœur discussed the central issues that 
dominate the thought of the Czech philosophers in his articles and lectures, 
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Patočka did not write any essays on Ricœur’s thought. Nevertheless, it does 
not mean that the relationship between these authors is univocal. Indeed, 
Patočka showed interest in Ricœur’s work, especially in his critique of 
transcendental idealism and his hermeneutics of symbols. The Ricœurian 
influence on Patočka’s oeuvre can be confirmed in his letters to the Polish 
philosopher Krzysztof Michalski, written between 1973 and 1976,7 but also in 
his objections to Husserl’s phenomenology and in his critical reading of 
Heidegger’s thought presented in his major works The Natural World as a 
Philosophical Problem (1936) and the Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History 
(1975).8  
At the basis of Ricœur’s and Patočka’s philosophies there is an intense 
intellectual and practical engagement with the social and political concerns of 
their time. There are many relevant biographical aspects of Ricœur’s life that 
have profoundly shaped his intellectual and moral profile. By advocating 
pacifism and Christian socialism, he became involved in the French socialist 
left-wing movements all during the 1930s. His pacifist ideals caused him to 
oppose French rearmament against Hitler, a stance he regretted later as a 
prisoner of war from 1940 to 1945. After the war, he was a fierce opponent of 
the French civil war in Algeria that led to an arrest and bomb threats, he was 
part of a movement in favor of student reforms and uprisings, and he was 
involved with Eastern European activists through the Cold War. As for 
Ricœur, Patočka’s life and moral convictions are inseparable from his thought. 
The Czech philosopher was the principal author and spokesman, together 
with Václav Havel and Jiri Hajek, of the civic initiative in the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic called Charter 77.9 In favor of human rights, the importance 
of Patočka’s contribution to the Charter 77 goes beyond the original aim of the 
declaration, pointing to the moral and political crisis in a society reduced to 
the sphere of instrumental rationality.10 Patočka died after being accused by 
his fellow-citizens of disrespecting the objects of their public worship and of 
attracting too many young followers. Just after his death, Ricœur published 
the article “Jan Patočka, le philosophe-résistant” in the journal Le Monde 
(March 19th, 1977) emphasizing the implications of the Czech thinker’s 
attitude of resistance for the men in power, the fellow citizens, and the 
outsiders.11 Patočka’s and Ricœur’s philosophical reflections and their 
personal engagement in political causes were a source of inspiration for 
philosophers and politicians who were connected with them. After Patočka’s 
death, the last Czechoslovak and the first Czech President Václav Havel 
emerged a strong political and philosophical force by continuing to apply 
Patočka’s thought in order to think the human condition under late 
communism and the meaning of dissidence. In a similar way, the French 
president Emmanuel Macron was influenced by his time with Ricœur, who 
broadened his horizons with ideas that have fresh resonance today.12 
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Belonging to the second generation of phenomenologists, Ricœur and 
Patočka thoroughly studied Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s 
philosophy of Being. Whereas Ricœur preserves phenomenology as a 
descriptive method and incorporates it into his own hermeneutics of the self, 
Patočka aims at establishing phenomenology as an inquiry into the appearing 
of things by freeing it from subjectivism and the metaphysics of 
consciousness. Ricœur moves, then, from a descriptive phenomenology as a 
reflection on human embodied will and the intentional modes of 
consciousness to the elaboration of a hermeneutic phenomenology as a 
methodology directed to the interpretation and description of human 
experience and its nature. Patočka develops instead an asubjective 
phenomenology, which describes being in terms of processes, thrusts, and 
movements, that is, a dialectical phenomenology of modes of becoming. 
Despite the differences in their ways of addressing phenomenology, Ricœur 
and Patočka appear to each other as partners in a common endeavor: to apply 
phenomenological insights to our lived existence as physically, socially, and 
culturally embedded in a shared world with others through and within time. 
As such, by focusing on human existence and its temporal dimension, their 
diverse works affect all sense fields of history.  
There has been relatively little research on the intersection between 
Ricœur’s and Patočka’s works around the problem of history.13 
Acknowledging that this topic occupies an important place in their entire 
philosophical projects, my analysis will be limited here to Ricœur’s early 
essay “Husserl and the Sense of History” (1949)14 and the first part of his 
oeuvre History and Truth entitled “Truth in the Knowledge of History” 
(1965),15 and to Patočka’s Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History (1975), 
with a particular focus on the third essay entitled “Does History have a 
Meaning?”16 Following Ricœur’s and Patočka’s lines of thought, I will show 
that their conceptions of history develop from a critical reading of Husserl’s 
reflections on the meaning of history (variously: Historie, Geschichte) and 
Heidegger’s analysis of the Dasein’s own historical existence. Behind general 
similarities between Ricœur and Patočka on history, lie divergences that need 
to be raised. My article will be divided into two sections. First, I will present 
how Ricœur and Patočka contribute to the development of a philosophical 
analysis of the meaning of history by using the phenomenological method. I 
will explain that their approaches to this topic are connected to their critical 
readings of Husserl’s Crisis project and to his mature conception of 
transcendental phenomenology as a description of full living in plurality.17 In 
the second part, I will discuss Ricœur’s and Patočka’s ideas on the historical 
openness towards the future. In this context, I will rely on Ricœur’s concepts 
of historicity and hope and Patočka’s idea of the care of the soul, that is, of the 
eternal dimension of our being, as influenced by Heidegger’s thought. Finally, 
these reflections will lead to a discussion of the limitations of Ricœur’s and 
Patočka’s Eurocentric perspectives on history. 
6 8  |  M a k i n g  S e n s e  o f  H i s t o r y  w i t h  P a u l  R i c œ u r  a n d  J a n  
P a t o č k a  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIX, No 1-2 (2021)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2021.988 
 
The Meaning of History as a Phenomenological Problem  
The phenomenology of Husserl had a permanent and profound impact 
on the philosophical formation of Ricœur and Patočka. Although Ricœur 
never met Husserl personally, in 1934–1935 he began to study his thought in 
Paris through the works of Eugen Fink, Gaston Berger, Emmanuel Levinas, 
and Merleau-Ponty. After the Second World War, Ricœur published his 
French translation of Husserl’s Ideen I (1950). In the same year, he put into 
practice Husserl’s phenomenology and published the first part of his 
Philosophy of the Will entitled Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary.18 Ricœur also presented his critical interpretation of Husserl’s 
writings, giving particular attention to his philosophy of consciousness, in a 
series of essays which were later collected as A l’école de la phénoménologie 
(1967).19 Among these, his 1949 essay “Husserl and the Sense of History” can 
be considered as Ricœur’s most original reflection on history as a theme 
central to his body of work as a whole. The sustained interest in history shifts 
and gains in profundity in his thought from his early views of history worked 
in his collection of essays, History and Truth (1965), in which he provides an 
introduction to the Husserlian elements which have influenced his own 
philosophical position, to his masterful trilogy Time and Narrative (1983–
1985),20 until his late monograph, Memory, History, Forgetting (2000).21 The 
topic of history is analyzed through different approaches, among them 
phenomenology, hermeneutics, ethics, moral philosophy, critical theory, and 
politics. Without denying the importance of his mature works, my analysis 
will be limited to his earliest writings. These provide highly significant 
elements and instructive interpretive keys with which to assess his broader 
thought on history. 
Like Ricœur, Patočka was from the very beginning of his thought closely 
connected to Husserl’s phenomenology. Spending the school year 1928–1929 
at the Sorbonne in Paris, Patočka attended a series of lectures given by 
Husserl, which were to develop into the Cartesian Meditations.22 Introduced a 
few years later to the final development of Husserl’s thought by the German 
phenomenologist himself, he took a decisive part in having Husserl invited 
by the Cercle philosophique de Prague for lectures at the German and the Czech 
University in Prague in 1935. These became the basis for Husserl’s last major 
work, the Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936), 
which had a profound impact on the direction of Patočka’s philosophical 
career. The critical analysis of Husserl’s diagnoses of the crisis of European 
modernity led Patočka to develop his own thematization of the concept of 
lifeworld (Lebenswelt) and to formulate a phenomenological philosophy of 
history. More precisely, as Ricœur argues, in Patočka’s work we can find an 
elliptical movement with two foci: the phenomenology of the natural world 
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and the question of the meaning of history.23 Patočka’s transition from the 
phenomenology of the natural world to the problematic of history follows a 
dialectical thread that begins with the phenomenology of the movement of 
life, passes through the problematic character of history and ends in the 
inquiry on the solidarity of the shaken.  
Ricœur’s and Patočka’s approaches to history and the question of its 
meaning arise from their critical reading of Husserl’s thought, in particular of 
his Crisis project. Prior to the Crisis, Husserl’s published works were focused 
on individual consciousness and the problem of the lived experience, rather 
than on the issue of the historical, social, and communal life. The Crisis 
represents, then, a change in direction in Husserl’s thought. It is in this oeuvre 
that he develops what he calls his own “teleological historical reflection” 
grounded on the intellectual reconstruction and the “backwards questioning” 
(Rückfragen) of the history of Western culture.24 The attention to the 
methodology and the status of the human and cultural sciences 
(Geisteswissenschaften) leads Husserl to explore the meaning of history 
through the history of philosophy and of the Western culture in general as 
exhibiting an intelligible structure. In his perspective, in which history is 
described as driven by an inherent teleology, Husserl supports a Eurocentric 
understanding of philosophy and history. Eurocentrism can be defined as the 
confusion or identification of “aspects of human abstract universality (or even 
transcendental) in general with moments of European particularity.”25 
Husserl’s teleological-historical Eurocentrism is evident in his definition of 
Europe as a “spiritual geography” having its own “spiritual historicity.”26 
Specifically, Husserl sees history, and paradigmatically the history of 
philosophy, as a form of meaning-making, and as the manner through which 
meanings become sedimented in being passed from one generation to 
another.27 In his 1949 influential article “Husserl and the Sense of History,” 
Ricœur tracks the German phenomenologist’s turn towards history. He 
recognizes that the analysis of Husserl’s account of the sense of history and 
the function of the history of philosophy provoke an interrogation concerning 
the very possibility of a philosophy of history. It is from this essay that the 
question of history explicitly comes up in Ricœur’s thought and returns in his 
writings in other guises, such as the status proper to the history of philosophy; 
objectivity and subjectivity in history; the sense of history in general; the place 
of violence and non-violence in history; the meaning of history and Christian 
eschatology, progress, ambiguity, hope, and so on. Ricœur’s first collection of 
articles on the topic of history, History and Truth (1965), bears the mark of his 
constant concern for the sense of history as a question connected to his critical 
reading of Husserl’s approach to this topic.  
Although Ricœur defines Husserl as “the most non-historic of 
professors,” he recognizes that “it was the very tragedy of history which 
inclined Husserl to think historically.”28 The political crisis in Europe in the 
mid-1930s prompts a question both about history and about human existence 
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in history. Husserl’s Crisis develops, then, as “an attempt at an etiology of 
crisis—the rise of National Socialism—and [. . .] a sketching out of a project 
for avoiding or overcoming it.”29 More precisely, National Socialism led 
Husserl to reflect upon how the spirit can become ill and to consider history 
as a place of danger and possible failure, but also to find a response to his own 
situation by pointing to “the sense and senselessness of man.”30 Therefore, 
according to Ricœur, Husserl’s interest in history and his elaborate treatment 
of the history of philosophy in his mature work can be explained as motivated 
by the need to face external circumstances linked to the turbulent events of 
the Nazi years. Consequently, Ricœur concludes that Husserl “was 
summoned by history to interpret himself historically.”31 Hence, the crisis of 
Western culture was the occasion for opening Husserl’s phenomenological 
project to history. Husserl’s awareness of the collective crisis of humanity 
leads him to reflect on the European man, his destiny and possible decline, as 
well as on the necessity to find possibilities for his rebirth. Ricœur observes 
that Husserl finally “situates his own philosophy in history with the 
conviction that it is responsible to this European man and that it alone can 
show him the way of his renewal.”32 The consciousness of the crisis within 
history pushes Husserl to question the sense and the goal of who we are and 
where we are going as humanity. Thus, Husserl’s philosophy of history goes 
from the European crisis to the search of meaning, i.e., from the doubting to 
the need for a renewed sense. Ricœur emphasizes the Kantian inheritance in 
Husserl’s phenomenology with reference to Kant’s 1784 essay “Idea for a 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim.”33 It is in this article that Kant 
focuses on the “unsociable sociability” (ungesellige Geselligkeit) of human 
beings as a spur to individual and social improvement. Husserl claims that it 
is in Europe that human being has a teleological sense, namely a task or an 
Idea in the Kantian sense of the term, which is “philosophy itself as the totality 
of understanding and as the infinite perspective of the sciences.”34 Indeed, 
Husserl’s aim is to give its whole breadth to the Idea of European humanity, 
considered from the point of view of the philosophy of history and to submit 
the European crisis to a new elucidation. In his thought the philosophy of 
history is conceived as marked by infinite tasks and as an unending progress. 
In this way, the concept of history involves a path for reason that is essentially 
progressive and that includes not only knowledge, but also speculative, 
ethical, and aesthetical perceptions.35 Thus, Ricœur argues that in Husserl’s 
Crisis “the notion of man qualifies the notion of reason in an existential and 
historical manner, while reason gives man a signification. Man is the image of 
his Ideas, and Ideas are like the paradigm for existence.”36 Whereas it is 
uncertain from Husserl’s position if Europe will abandon or resurrect its 
universal humanistic mission, his analysis of the European possibilities and 
his perspective on history remain overtly Eurocentric. Husserl places the 
origin of philosophy in ancient Greece and projects onto Europe alone as the 
bearer of the meaning of the development of human civilization. According 
M a r i a  C r i s t i n a  C l o r i n d a  V e n d r a  |  7 1  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIX, No 1-2 (2021)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2021.988 
to him, Europe is not a geographical reality “as on a map, as if thereby the 
group of people who live together in this territory would define his defense 
of endangered European humanity.”37 He problematically insists on the 
notion of the “spiritual sense” of Europe and on the unity experienced as the 
European homeland. The exclusion of different civilizations such as India, 
China, Eskimoes, Gypsies, from humanity’s destiny and teleology as 
European, is an arbitrary prejudice.38 Also his attempt to present a 
comparative typology between the European and non-European as centered 
on the notion of familiarity and strangeness is inadequate to categorize 
historical humanity as a whole. Moreover, by focusing his attention on the 
“European crisis,” Husserl lacks of any comprehension of the global crisis of 
humanity and of “the paradoxes of modernization and Westernalization in 
the non-Western colonial and semicolonial world.”39 Motivated by the 
Cartesian mode of understanding the history of Western philosophy as 
Greek-European science, Husserl’s reading of history is characterized by a 
scientific conception of the history of philosophy, though he himself rejects 
Descartes’s objectivism. His Eurocentrism has troubled and continue to 
concern phenomenologists and philosophers of all boards. A philosophic 
judgment of Husserl’s Eurocentric overtones and Western categories is, then, 
necessarily required. 
As Ricœur’s analysis of Husserl’s turn towards the question of history 
profoundly influenced his approach to this topic, Patočka’s reading of Husserl 
opens up several questions that would illuminate his thought. It is in his early 
essays entitled “On the Philosophy of History” (1940) and “History of 
Philosophy and its Unity” (1942) that Patočka outlines his methodological and 
theoretical principles to analyze the history of philosophy and begins to 
develop his own reflection on history.40 More precisely, Patočka’s critical 
approach to Husserl’s work has a profound impact on the elaboration of his 
thought as dominated by the analysis of the unity of the history of philosophy 
(Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Comenius, Herder, Hegel, Marx, Comte, 
etc.) and of his own philosophy of history within the theoretical space of the 
phenomenological movement. The most elaborated form of Patočka’s 
conception of history can be found in his late works: Plato and Europe (1973) 
and the Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History (1975).41 Like Ricœur, 
Patočka recognizes that Husserl’s late attention to history “is marked by a 
conviction that European humanity is passing through a protracted spiritual 
crisis whose roots must be sought deep in the past, at the very beginning of 
modern thought.”42 Both Patočka and Ricœur feel the necessity to answer to 
the problem of the modern philosophy and science in Europe, that is, to 
recognize the symptoms and find responses to the spiritual crisis affecting the 
modern man as having no unified worldview, namely as a being living “at 
once in his own naturally given environment and in a world created for him 
by modern natural science, based on the principle of mathematical laws 
governing nature.”43  
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Ricœur and Patočka recognize Husserl’s larger concern with the 
dynamics of history and they are aware of the challenges of thinking history 
in the aftermath of his phenomenology. In History and Truth, Ricœur broadens 
and expands his previous analyses of Husserl’s phenomenological approach 
to history. Specifically, it is in the first part of his oeuvre entitled “Truth in the 
Knowledge of History” that Ricœur aims at addressing the problem of the 
meaning of history moving from his reading of Husserl. As Ricœur points out, 
the keyword of Husserl’s approach to history is that of the “advent of 
meaning.”44  Indeed, believing in a certain teleology of history, Husserl thinks 
that mankind is unified in its theoretical meaning. Hence, Husserl’s attempt 
is to justify the meaning of history of the consciousness, expecting a certain 
coincidence between the meaning of self-knowledge and that of history. 
Contrary to the historian’s history, which is attentive to the meaning of the 
events in themselves, Ricœur accuses Husserl to have abandoned in his 
history of consciousness not only the non-meaningful “from which every 
sense is taken” but also “the individual, the non-systematizable, and the 
exceptional.”45 The analysis of Husserl’s perspective on history leads Ricœur 
to discuss a different philosophical interpretation of history attentive to 
singularity. As he puts it, history does not unfold itself as a cohesive 
movement of a system, but it weaves “itself into persons  and works.”46 In this 
context, history is understood “as a series of disconnected appearances, each 
of which requires a new and total encounter.”47 Whereas in Husserl’s thought 
history appears as a unique human consciousness whose meaning progresses 
through logical moments, in the opposed approach history is understood as a 
multiple emergence, as a disconnected series of upheavals having their own 
specific meanings. Ricœur introduces his own conception of history as a 
dimension which “is virtually continuous and discontinuous, continuous as a 
unique meaning in progress and discontinuous as a configuration of 
persons.”48 According to Ricœur, the meaning of history cannot be reduced to 
a development of a sequence. Contrary to history as an advent of 
consciousness’s meaning leaning towards an optimistic ideal, “the 
interpretation of history which takes account of the sudden appearance of 
individual centers of consciousness leads rather to a tragic vision of the 
ambiguity of man who always begins anew and who may always defect.”49 
Ricœur recognizes, then, that the meaning of history is an imperfect 
mediation, that is, it arises from the interweaving of different perspectives of 
anticipation of the future, reception of the past, and lived experience of the 
present, without upholding the idea of a totality where reason in history  and 
its reality would finally coincide. 
According to Patočka the question of the meaning of history requires a 
preliminary clarification of the concept of meaning itself. In the third essay of 
his Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History entitled “Does History have a 
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Meaning?” Patočka begins his analysis with the revision of Frege’s distinction 
between the notions of “meaning-sense” and that of “significance-
reference.”50 Whereas significance indicates an objective relation and it is 
often limited to realm of λόγος, meaning deals with the conception of an 
object, it renders something intelligible and it pertains to something more real 
such as feelings and actions. Neither meaning can be reduced to purpose or 
value, nor to something obvious. As Patočka explains, “when we speak, for 
instance, of the meaning of suffering, the meaning of anxiety, the meaning of 
corporeity [. . .] in all these instances meaning is [. . .] something we need to 
reach through an explanation.”51 Meaning requires, then, the work of 
interpretation in order to be unveiled. In phenomenological terms, meaning 
as a progressive movement has to be searched through the openness of things 
themselves. But contrary to any subjectivistic position, in his 
phenomenological view Patočka argues that the meaning does not exclusively 
depend on us because we do not have the power “to keep things from 
appearing meaningless under some circumstances and, hand in hand with 
that, to keep meaning from speaking to us from things if we are open to it.”52 
Hence, we are open to both meaningful and meaningless reality. This double 
possibility embedded in things testifies the problematicity of all meaning. I 
claim that Patočka follows here Ricœur in acknowledging that we must 
consider the opposition between meaningful and meaningless aspects of 
things. With reference to Wilhelm Weischedel, Patočka argues that meaning 
is not something individual, but each meaning refers to “a global meaning of 
the totality of what-is, of life and of events.”53 However, life must not be seen 
as the continuous illusion of a total meaning that has to be uninterruptedly 
researched. Beyond the radical skepticism of nihilism based on the disbelief 
in meaning that is independent of human life and the original and uncritical 
faith in meaning, Patočka finds a third way. As Ricœur clearly argues in the 
preface of Patočka’s Heretical Essays, “haunted by nihilism, Patočka saw a way 
out in the notion of problematicity itself, a concept which appeared to him to 
evade both the dogmatic ‘non meaning’ of the cynical disciples of Nietzsche 
as well as the dogmatism of any straightforward apologetic of meaning.”54 
According to Patočka, it is necessary to question “what the phenomenon of a 
loss of meaning itself means.”55  It is, then, from the loss of meaning that 
human beings find themselves pushed to search for meaning in the 
problematicity of things. Coherently, Ricœur argues that for Patočka, within 
the condition of problematicity meaning is “a proper meaning, a meaning 
neither too modest nor dogmatic, which gives courage for a life in the 
atmosphere of the problematic.”56  
It is in this context marked by the problematic of the nature of meaning, 
that Patočka discusses the meaning of history moving from the distinction 
between prehistoric humanity and history, that is, between the natural and 
the historical world. History is not a given of the natural world; rather, history 
is an intellectual and spiritual effort to link events onto a meaningful whole, 
that is, it is a movement towards the truth. Patočka argues that “history differs 
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from prehistoric humanity by the shaking of accepted meaning. We would be 
asking erroneously if we were to ask what caused this shock; it is as vain as 
asking what causes humans to leave their sheltered childhood for a self-
responsible adulthood.”57 The movement from the prehistorical to the 
historical world consists, then, in a changing of perspective from a given and 
unshakable meaning to an understanding of meaning as problematic. 
Patočka’s conception of history as linked to his idea of Europe shares with 
Husserl a strict universalism as well as a Eurocentric vision. When speaking 
about history and its meaning, Patočka has in his mind Western philosophy 
and politics. Indeed, he argues that philosophy “as the radical question of 
meaning based on the shaking of the naïve, directly accepted meaning of life 
developed only along western lines.”58 As Patočka observes, we can speak of 
history “where life becomes free and whole, where it consciously builds room 
for an equally free life [. . .] where humans dare to undertake new attempts at 
bestowing meaning on themselves in the light of the way the being of the 
world into which they have been set manifests itself to them.”59 The light of 
the being of the world refers here to what is disclosed by philosophy as 
building room for an equally free life in its Greek origins. Patočka’s language 
used in his Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History clearly runs the risk of 
Eurocentrism. The influence of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s thought in the 
development of his analysis of history, leads Patočka to dangerously argue 
that there is no other history than European history and consequently that 
history emerges and continues with the philosophical spirit, which is carried 
essentially by Western Europe.60  Like Husserl, Patočka is not concerned with 
Europe seen as a geographical area, but with it as a spiritual phenomenon. 
More precisely, history is understood as the establishment of the spiritual 
foundations of human existence. Consequently, historicity is linked to human 
being’s spiritual existence. Such a conception of history and its corresponding 
philosophy of history appears to be naïve and hazardous.61  Which would be 
for example the conditions upon which European life could become free and 
whole? How can it build an equally free life? More generally, what does 
Europe still have to offer spiritually after its crisis? Patočka does not give any 
clear answer to such questions. Although the Eurocentric vision has been 
prevalent until the twentieth century, we have the necessary duty to distance 
ourselves from this perspective, we must criticize and resist this claim to 
reproduce the same scheme of thought. According to Patočka, history begins 
only with Greek civilization, which suspends and challenges the political, 
cosmological, and natural orders. The denaturalization of meaning done by 
the Greeks corresponds to the problematicity of meaning standing at the very 
foundations of European civilization. Patočka speaks, then, of a new vision of 
the world in which the search for the meaning is a risky process. The 
beginning of history marks the emergence of a new relation to human finitude 
as linked to the possibility of discomfort, misunderstanding, and all the 
different forms of strife and conflict into which human beings are embedded. 
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The meaning of history becomes an open problem, that cannot be preliminary 
defined, namely, it is something always at stake in the drama of human 
finitude and freedom. Far from all acceptance, human life in history finds 
itself exposed to risk, i.e., historical life is a “on a boundary over which it 
cannot step along which everything is transformed.”62 Patočka highlights, 
then, the problematicity of the meaning of history as consisting in the shaking 
of presupposed meanings. 
Before proceeding any further, let me briefly summarize what we have 
discussed so far. We have seen that Ricœur and Patočka are aware of the 
significance of the evolution of Husserl’s phenomenology reflected in the 
Crisis. Both authors recognize that the crisis of Western culture represents the 
occasion for opening Husserl’s phenomenological project to history. The 
situatedness of the consciousness in a time of crisis leads Husserl to look for 
the source of the time of crisis in a questioning-back and to a reconsideration 
of the lifeworld as the non-thematic ground of experience. Ricœur’s reading 
of Husserl leads him to reject the idea of history as a totality, as an absolute 
mediation, or as the full and perfect realization of meaning. Although he gives 
up the Hegelian idea of history, Ricœur does not deny the necessity to search 
for meaning in history as an incomplete and imperfect mediation of the 
reception of the past, the experience of the present, and the expectation for the 
future. Husserl’s attempt to understand the crisis of Europe during the mid-
1930s by examining the history of Europe as a spiritual and cultural crisis, has 
a profound influence also on Patočka’s philosophy of history. According to 
Patočka, history is the trembling of any given and finite certainty of meaning. 
As such, there is no truth standing over human history and finding its 
fulfillment in it. Every meaning is, then, created in the deeds of our finite 
existence and can be only situational. The fact that meaning is relative to the 
human finite situation implies the necessity that to constantly reaffirm it 
through the Socratic elenctic and protreptic methods, that is, “through the 
searching for new questions and answers with others by providing reasons 
that we can give an account for.”63  
 
On the Openness of Historicity  
Whereas the metaphysical and the epistemological approaches to history 
are focused respectively on what history is, how it exists, and how we know 
it considering the gap between past and present, phenomenology is primarily 
concerned about how past events are given to us and what our experience of 
them is like. In other words, phenomenology inquiries the ways in which 
history present to us, how it enters our lives, and the forms of experience in 
which it is involved. The phenomenological perspective focuses, then, on 
history as a phenomenon and on the lived experience of the historical. The 
notion of experience is at the core of the phenomenological reflection on 
history.64 We do not just exist in history as beings who passively belong to an 
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historical context characterized by particular political and social frameworks. 
Rather, we are ourselves historical beings involved in the historical reality and 
concerned by historical events. In this context, our experience is not just 
observation, but also interaction within the world as historically shaped. 
Otherwise put, we are intertwined with history through our individual 
historicity, i.e., through our situatedness and active participation into an 
historical world. Thus, as a defining feature of our existence, historicity places 
us in the dialectic between our belonging to an historical world and our 
appropriation of it. Let us now turn to Ricœur’s and Patočka’s conceptions of 
history as a dynamic phenomenon involving the consideration of the past into 
the present, but also our expectations for the future.  
Parallel to their critical retrievals of Husserl’s phenomenology, Ricœur’s 
and Patočka’s analyses on the topic of history are profoundly influenced by 
Heidegger’s philosophy. Ricœur met Heidegger in France in 1955 during the 
Cerisy Colloquium. Influenced by Heidegger’s thought, Ricœur took his work 
on phenomenology beyond eidetic and existentialist phenomenology 
opening it up towards a phenomenology that was hermeneutic in its focus.65 
In 1933, Patočka received a Humboldt fellowship and an invitation to work 
under Husserl’s supervision in Freiburg. It was during the summer semester 
of that year that Patočka attended a few of Heidegger’s lectures. Patočka 
recognized that Heidegger’s ontological perspective was one of the great 
accomplishments of the twentieth-century. However, he considered 
Heidegger’s philosophy as not fully appropriate to the understanding of 
human existence as long as it is not just related to self-understanding but also 
to the body, community, language, and the world.66 Ricœur and Patočka 
acknowledge that in Heidegger’s thought the question of history belongs 
among the most fundamental questions of human existence. According to 
Heidegger, being historical is a feature of the Dasein and history has always 
an existential qualification made by human beings in the present for the sake 
of their future. In Heidegger’s view, the happening of history is the happening 
of being-in-the-world.67 Similarly to Husserl, Heidegger develops a 
Eurocentric vision of history and philosophy as born in Greece and coming to 
adulthood in Germany. His Eurocentric prejudice can be summed up in the 
affirmation that the history of human thought is the history of European 
thought. According to him, “the history of Being is more than an ontic 
narrative of Western historicality. It is a unique story about the origin of man 
and of the world in the ontological sense. In the meantime, the Other is invited 
to join, through the medium of a dialogue with early Greek thinkers, in the 
project of retrieving the first beginning and embarking onto the other 
beginning.”68 Together with the conception of the Greek and the German as 
the two most philosophical of the European languages, in his 1935 lecture 
course Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger presents also a Eurocentric 
analysis of the various geopolitical responses to technological globalization 
seen as a pathology of the culmination of the history of Western 
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metaphysics.69 The ethnocentrism of Heidegger’s philosophy of history, his 
prejudices, and political commitments deserve to be radically criticized in 
order to develop a different and more adequate conception of history, that is, 
a less ethnocentric and a more intercultural approach.  
There are two major ideas in Heidegger’s perspective on history that are 
critically retrieved by Ricœur and Patočka: thrownness and projection. First, 
Heidegger stresses the finitude and thrownness of the Dasein, that is, of its 
coming into existence without being asked. In its being-already-in-the-world, 
Dasein deals with its own facticity as received from the past. Heidegger 
distinguishes at this point the inauthentic and the authentic Dasein. Whereas 
the first is characterized by its absorption in everyday life without questioning 
or choosing its mode of existence, the second is aware of its thrownness and 
recalls the significance of its past and understands it in terms of the current 
possibilities it provides. Second, the notion of thrownness is taken up by 
Heidegger in parallel with the emphasis on Dasein’s projection into the 
future. In its being-ahead-of-itself, Dasein attempts to define itself in the 
present through the awareness of its future possibilities. Whereas for the 
inauthentic Dasein the future is seen as a generalized waiting to see what will 
happen, the authentic Dasein anticipates its mortality, remembers its own 
responsibility and is aware of the possibilities provided by thrownness. 
Dasein’s thrownness and projection are implied in its Being as care 
characterized by anticipatory resoluteness. Without going into the complete 
details of Heidegger’s influence on Ricœur’s and Patočka’s thinking on 
history, my focus here will be on thematizing the impact of Heideggerian 
thought on the Ricœurian concept of historicity and Patočka’s notion of the 
care of the soul as related to the question of the meaning of history.  
History and historicity refer, each in its own way, to the same 
fundamental feature of human being’s individual, collective, and social 
existence. As Ricœur puts it, “because history is our history, the sense of 
history is our sense.”70 Therefore, there is “a certain mutual belonging 
between the act of narrating (or writing) history and the fact of being in 
history, between doing history and being historical.”71 Recalling the 
etymological sense of the word history from the Greek term ῐ̔στορῐ́ᾱ, Ricœur 
precises that history is not “an anxious interrogation on our discouraging 
historicity, on our way of living and sliding along in time, but rather [it is] a 
reply to this ‘historical’ condition—a reply through the choice of history, 
through the choice of a certain knowledge, of a will to understand 
rationally.”72 Considered from a phenomenological perspective, the concept 
of historicity refers to our finite condition, i.e., to our concrete life as spanned 
out in time, to the conscious and subconscious understanding of ourselves as 
passing in and through a language and a culture that have been passed down 
through a tradition to which we belong. The concept of historicity finds, then, 
its own meaning in relation to Ricœur’s phenomenological valorization of 
human embodiment. Following his line of reasoning, historicity can be 
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defined as human being’s bodily engagement with the world as the 
spatiotemporal dimension of our existence. Historicity represents at once an 
enabling condition and a limitation for our understanding. Ricœur further 
develops his reflections on historicity in the more recent phase of his 
hermeneutic project including his three-volume Time and Narrative, which can 
be read as an investigation on the historicity of existence. More precisely, 
Ricœur recognizes that narration is the modality that makes the dimension of 
historical individuality effective. As historical beings, our “personalities 
mature by placing themselves in a narrated time and within a determined 
(narrated and experienced) tradition.”73 Although Ricœur’s argument is 
influenced by Heidegger’s notion of thrownness (Geworfenheit), he criticizes 
Heidegger’s treatment of historicity for two major reasons. First, Ricœur 
confers to the notion of historicity a social dimension. According to Ricœur, 
Heidegger’s analysis on the Dasein’s historicity is individualistic. Rather than 
viewing the Dasein’s historical heritage as inherently social, Heidegger 
wrongly sees it as monadic, concentrating his analysis on the individual and 
non-transferable possibility of being-towards-death. As we are thrown into 
the world, we find ourselves as involved within a heritage that is transmitted 
through generations. In Ricœur’s view, historicity becomes a public 
dimension. Second, Ricœur gives to the notion of historicity a hopeful 
orientation. According to Ricœur, historicity as a form of public time “breaks 
free from the stranglehold of mortality which Heidegger considers to be the 
authentic form of human being-in-time.”74 Otherwise put, Ricœur challenges 
Heidegger’s analysis of being-towards-death as the most authentic form of 
human existence. Although Ricœur agrees with Heidegger in considering 
human being as a being-ahead-of-itself, that is, as possibility, he does nor 
share with Heidegger the conviction that being-towards-death is the only 
authentic mode of existence. Indeed, with reference to Augustine and the 
Christian tradition, Ricœur develops a view of philosophy which is “more a 
celebration of life rather than a preparation for death.” Already in his early 
phenomenology, Ricœur described human life as “the joy of ‘yes’ in the 
sadness of the finite.”75 In this way, the meaning of history and historicity are 
thought as part of a thinking according to hope. Our understanding of history 
is not a resignation, but a firm commitment to the concrete horizon brought 
forth by human historical existence itself.  
Patočka was profoundly inspired by Heidegger’s concept of Dasein and 
by his examination of human existence in the world as presented in Being and 
Time. Whereas Husserl presented an ahistorical subjectivity, Heidegger was 
concerned about the relationship between human being and the Being, as an 
historical relationship that is manifested in human freedom and 
responsibility. Patočka argues that “Heidegger is a philosopher of the 
primacy of freedom and in his view, history is not a drama which unfolds 
before our eyes but a responsible realization of the relation which humans are. 
History is not a perception but a responsibility.”76 However, although 
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Heidegger’s thought provided a way for Patočka to develop his own 
understanding of human existence, the Czech philosopher recognized that the 
insights of the Heideggerian ontological philosophy were necessary but not 
entirely sufficient for a philosophical understanding of “the concrete humans 
in their corporeal worlds.”77 Therefore, by pushing Heidegger’s Being and 
Time beyond where the German author intended it, Patočka’s philosophy is 
not Heideggerian, but it is built on the Heideggerian foundations. In his 
thought Patočka makes use of a central theme presented by Heidegger’s 
thought when he speaks about “care.” In Heidegger’s view, the concept of 
care is what defines the being of the Dasein and implies an essential concern 
directed towards our relationships with the beings in the world. More 
precisely, the care is the existential a priori that precedes the situations of 
Dasein. Patočka uses Heidegger’s idea of care, but he combines to the 
Heideggerian perspective the sense of care presented by the Socratic 
dialogues. Whereas for Heidegger care pertains to Dasein, Patočka refers to 
the Socratic perspectives according to which care is of the soul. Deeply 
influenced by Socrates and Plato, Patočka sees philosophy not only as a 
theoretical enterprise but as a way of life. According to him: “philosophy is 
not the ultimate abstraction; rather it is the work of living beings, living minds 
on their hard and lonely way of search. The philosophizing minds are not 
indifferent to meeting other minds, sometimes across centuries or even 
millennia; many a time, it is the ultimate, or even the only thing. And the 
particular environment in which it happens is the history of philosophy.”78 
For Patočka, it was Socrates the first who focused on the idea of human 
responsibility as connected not just to human thinking, but also to the acting 
into the world. Patočka recognizes, then, in the Greek heritage on which 
Europe was built, the idea of the care for the soul. This topic is already present 
in his 1947 lectures on Socrates held at Charles University of Prague and it 
culminates in his 1970s works, especially in his Heretical Essays in the 
Philosophy of History, in his Europe and Post-Europe as well as in his lecture 
course Plato and Europe in which he continues reflecting on the current 
situation of the world. The idea of the care for the soul was displaced from 
philosophical reflection by the modern scientific venture, that is, by the 
ascendancy of mathematical sciences in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century. But the meaning of one’s being cannot be expressed by laws coming 
from the empirical domain of things.79 Patočka returns, then, to Socrates as 
representing the open moment of philosophical inquiry into the meaning of 
the world as a whole, an openness that needs to be restored. As Patočka puts 
it, “care for the soul is the bequest of ancient Greek philosophy. Care for the 
soul means that truth is something not given once and for all, not merely a 
matter of observing and acknowledging the observed, but rather a lifelong 
inquiry, a self-controlling, self-unifying intellectual and vital practice.”80 To 
return to Socrates means for Patočka to reconsider the question of how we can 
live in a world where traditional beliefs and the meaning are in crisis. 
Therefore, we have to “shake the everydayness of the fact-crunchers and 
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routine minds”81  to see beyond the scientific reasoning and its critique. The 
care of the soul involves the realization that our understanding cannot be 
reduced to mathematised certainty and that our knowledge is finite since we 
are finite human beings. In short, to take care for our soul means “to care for 
truth and freedom of thinking by questioning presuppositions that we 
inherited from our tradition.”82 To take care of the soul is essential in the 
attempt to confront the crisis of meaning, that is, to try to live a responsible 
life when old values are no more meaningful and the new ones are not yet 
clear. It is by virtue of the critical understanding of our historical situation that 
the possibility of the future opens to us. It is in this context that Patočka speaks 
of the possibility of reconquering hope in the present historical epoch marked 
by the horror generated by the wars. He argues: “It is thus certain that the 
efforts done in order to turn at last our attention away from this terror, to let 
ourselves be penetrated and supported by the great tasks which call for us, if 
we listen to the situation of our epoch in the spheres of action, of knowledge 
and of art, these efforts have a positive meaning, even if we should neither 
neglect their limits. We see the constitution of philosophies and theologies of 
hope. Hope is not a simple relied of the horror and of the fear which the 
dangers inspire us, dangers to which our epoch is exposed, but the very 
possibility of opening us to a future. Generally speaking, the discovery of the 
future is one of the most important and most characteristic features of our 
present.”83 Like Ricœur, Patočka is critical of the objectifying of the horizon of 
the future: “modern ideologies objectify the open horizon and thus create an 
enclosing horizon that needs to be broken through, in order to find the true 
openness of the horizon of time, that can never be stifled, but also needs its 
humble and careful determinations.”84 However, whereas Ricœur refers to the 
Christian eschatology, Patočka’s perspective on history is not messianic at all, 
but still leaves place for hope.85 
Heidegger understands history as an “ever-repeated rising out of 
fallenness,”86  which can be hidden beneath the mask of progress, humanism, 
and power. As inherently connected to Dasein’s historical condition of 
thrownness into the world, fallenness can’t be surpassed. According to 
Ricœur, concentrating his analysis on Dasein’s fallenness and the non-
transferable possibility of being-towards-death, Heidegger’s view on 
historicity is individualistic and monadic. Against Heidegger, Ricœur rejects 
the idea to conceive anxiety as the fundamental way of human being in the 
world. He argues, then, that joy and hope have an equal claim to be seen as 
basic clue to the meaning of history and humanity. Criticizing Heidegger’s 
negative perspective, Ricœur’s thought presents a belief in transcendence, 
namely, a desire to say “yes” in spite of the negative aspects affecting our 
existence as historical beings. Contrary to Heidegger, Patočka’s philosophy of 
history is grounded on the idea that there is the possibility to restore the 
meaning of history even though peace is only a fragile balance. Otherwise put, 
Patočka believes that meaning can be restored even out of events that 
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presumably trigger no hope or revival. Patočka’s analysis of the fundamental 
dimension of the care of the soul can be understood as a full assumption of 
the problematicity of history, as involved into the attempt to restore the sense 
of community and to redefine human actions under extreme crisis. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article I have explored to what extent Ricœur’s and Patočka’s 
works offer significant contributions to the understanding of history and its 
meaning. Emerging from the witness of a deep crisis of history brought up by 
the great disasters of the two World Wars and from the related alteration of 
the very manner of comprehending human being’s historical experience, 
Ricœur’s and Patočka’s analyses focus on history as a complex phenomenon. 
I showed that their conceptions of history can be understood only through a 
careful analysis of their critical reading of Husserl’s works, in particular of his 
late reflections in the Crisis, and Heidegger’s phenomenological analyses of 
Dasein. Ricœur and Patočka attempt to give an answer to what exactly is 
meant by history. The problem of the meaning of history is connected to the 
historicity of human existence. Nevertheless, the comparison between 
Ricœur’s and Patočka’s approaches to history has shown their inner 
limitations with respect to thinking history and its meaning. In concluding 
this paper, let me briefly criticize their limited understanding of the historical 
world as marked by the Eurocentric prejudice.  
Ricœur’s and Patočka’s analyses of history display an unsolved 
confusion between what history is in general and European history. On the 
one hand, Ricœur and Patočka might be considered to be right to approve 
Husserl’s and Heidegger’s claim that the European thought presents the 
forms of generality and universality which become characteristic of the 
European history. Yet, they acknowledge that the European way of thinking 
was imposed everywhere and it was accompanied by a specific type of 
violence. The imposition of the European will to other countries was criticized 
by critical theorists, postcolonial thinkers, but also admitted by Ricœur and 
Patočka as well.87 On the other hand, though, Ricœur and Patočka are finally 
unable to critically distance themselves from the European cultural endeavors 
and to coherently reject the presupposed superiority over other forms of 
rationality and modes of existence. In short, these authors seem to show an 
inability to explain how to truly listen to different non-Western or non-
European set of historical contexts, cultural traditions, and othered 
conceptualization of historical experiences. 
After the Second World War, Europe has lost its position as the center of 
world history. The end of Europe is taken by Patočka as an historical fact. 
Although the Czech author is concerned about the “post-European” historical 
era, he does not discuss about how to deal with the idea of Europe as 
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determinant of our historical self-understanding. Otherwise put, Patočka’s 
claim that there is only European history but that we are living in a post-
Europe historical context ends up to be an unsolved paradox. By assuming 
that history has spiritual foundations and that it can be understood only 
through them, in his works Patočka does not abandon the connection among 
the concepts of history, sprit, and foundation. Against the background of the 
modern crisis, Patočka’s perspective on the post-European epoch is not freed 
from the problematic character of those three recurring notions. In this 
context, Patočka does not recognize that the care for the soul can be said not 
to be really exclusive to the Greek heritage. Agreeing with Aviezer Tucker’s 
analysis of Patočka’s thought, it is probably due to cultural biases that Patočka 
does not consider that also Eastern religions, such as Buddhism, might refer 
to a similar notion of spirituality.88 Moreover, according to Patočka it is the 
open soul of the Europeans that has to encounter the new world’s spiritual 
attitude. In this way, he continues to accord a spiritual supremacy of Europe 
over non-European societies. Finally, we can state with Ricœur and Patočka 
that the meaning of history must be constantly questioned, but this 
questioning is more far-reaching than what Ricœur and Patočka 
acknowledged in their own accounts of history. 
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